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INSURANCE
INSURER'S OPTION TO REPAIR INSURED PROPERTY-
REASONABLENESS AS TO TIME AND PLACE
Arkansas. In Resolute Ins. Co. v. Mize' defendant insurance
company sought to avoid liability under a policy insuring a truck
against damages on the ground that it had offered to make repairs
to the damaged truck and the insured owner had refused to per-
mit the repairs to be made. The policy provided: "The company
may pay for the loss in money or may repair or replace the
automobile." Several estimates were made of the cost of repairing
the truck. Three companies in the neighborhood of Little Rock,
Arkansas, submitted estimates in the amounts of $4,219.07,
$4,910.34, and $2,395.95, respectively. A fourth firm in Tulsa,
Oklahoma, submitted an estimate of $1,849.61. The insurance
company offered to have the truck repaired by the Tulsa concern,
which offer the insured owner refused, and the insurance com-
pany made no offer to have the truck repaired elsewhere.
The Supreme Court of Arkansas pointed out that the weight of
authority holds that an option to repair must be exercised within
a reasonable time.2 On the basis of this principle it held that a
similar rule of reason should govern as to the designation of a place
in which to make the repairs. Going on to say that each case de-
pends largely upon its own particular facts in connection with the
application of rules of reason, the court pointed out that it was
obviously not unreasonable to remove a car a short distance for
repairs, or perhaps to remove a car to another state as from Tex-
arkana, Arkansas, to Texarkana, Texas. However, to require the
removal of the vehicle to a distant point in another state, when
there exist ample facilities locally to make the repairs, would be
wholly unreasonable. The court held that there was substantial
1 .........-Ark  ......, 255 S. W . 2d 682 (1953).
2 29 AM. JUR., Insurance, § 1267.
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evidence to sustain the finding of the trial court, sitting as a jury,
that the request was unreasonable.
Having decided in this manner, the court brushed aside the in-
surance company's next contention that the amount of recovery
should be limited to that of the lowest estimate. It held that since
the insured was justified in not taking the truck to Tulsa for re-
pairs and there having been no offer to repair the truck elsewhere,
the measure of damages should be the difference in the market
value of the truck immediately before and after the accident.
The court's extension of the rule of reason to cover place of
repair operates, as does the analogous rule relative to time, to
limit the means by which an insurer may obstruct a fair and
reasonable settlement of the claim by virtue of the option to re-
pair clause. The protection thus afforded the insured against un-
scrupulous delaying tactics on the part of insurance companies
in reaching settlements is desirable and justifies the judicial limi-
tation of the clause in question.
DISPOSITION OF PROCEEDS OF LIFE INSURANCE CERTIFICATE
WHERE INSURER AND BENEFICIARY PERISH IN
COMMON DISASTER
Texas. In Sherman v. Roe' one of the basic issues was centered
around the construction placed by the court of civil appeals on
a clause contained in a certificate of insurance framed in the fol-
lowing words:
Indemnity for loss of life of the Employee is payable to the bene-
ficiary if surviving the Employee, and otherwise to the estate of the
Employee.
The suit was instituted by bill of interpleader filed by the in-
surer asking that the administrators of the estates of Edna Roe
and James Roe set up their respective claims. James Roe was the
----- ------- Tex ---------- 262 S. W . 2d 393 (1953).
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insured, and Edna was his wife. Both perished in a common dis-
aster, and no evidence was introduced which pointed to survivor-
ship by either party or to simultaneous death. The certificate in
question had been in effect for several years prior to the marriage
of James and Edna Roe and provided for coverage in the amount
of $2,000 in the event of James Roe's death. During the year fol-
lowing the marriage, Edna Roe was designated as beneficiary,
and some three years later the amount payable under the cer-
tificate was changed to $9,000.
The court of civil appeals had held that under the provisions
of the clause set out above, the burden rested on the plaintiffs to
prove that the wife had survived the husband in order to recover
the proceeds. Conversely, it held that in the absence of such proof,
the estate of the husband should recover. The supreme court
rejected this view, however, and pointed out that it would be just
as reasonable to place the burden of proof on the defendant in
connection with establishing simultaneous death or survival by
the husband. The court observed that under the common law there
was no presumption either of survivorship or of simultaneous
death, and pointed to the undesirability of deciding the case on
the basis of this principle when there was no proof as to the exist-
ence of either.
It was decided that the administrator of the wife's estate could
base no claim to the proceeds on the ground that the wife had a
vested interest in the certificate as beneficiary. The court affirmed
the rule announced in Volunteer Life Insurance Co. v. Hardin'
to the effect that a wife has no vested interest in a policy prior
to the husband's death even though she is named as beneficiary
and the premiums thereon are paid from community funds. The
court did state, however, that in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, it would be presumed that premiums after marriage
were paid from community funds, and that any separate property
4 145 Tex. 245, 197 S. W. 2d 105 (1946).
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rights to proceeds accruing to the husband by virtue of his pre-
mium payments before marriage passed to the community.
Noting that the proceeds of the certificate had been paid into
the registry of the court where they were held for one or the
other or both of the estates, and reiterating the fact that neither
survivorship nor simultaneous death could be proved, the court
declared that the proceeds should, by reason of the community
property statutes,' be deemed community effects, and awarded one-
half to the estate of the insured and one-half to the estate of
the wife.
Existing law prior to the decision announced here appears to
support the holding of the court of civil appeals. The rule has
been stated as follows:
Where the insured and the beneficiary die in a common disaster, the
rule against presumption of survivorship applies, and, as between
claimants to the proceeds of insurance, if there is no proof of actual
survivorship the claimant upon whom the law casts the burden of
proving survivorship fails and cannot take.6
This rule is drawn from the case of Hildenbrandt v. Ames,7 where
a life policy provided that it should be payable to a certain bene-
ficiary if living, otherwise to the executors of the insured. The
insured and the beneficiary were husband and wife respectively,
and both perished in the Galveston flood at the turn of the cen-
tury. There, the burden of proof was placed upon the adminis-
trator of the estate of the beneficiary to show that his decedent
had survived the insured. No proof could be established as to sur-
vivorship by the wife. In the resulting judgment for the estate of
the insured, the court held that there should be no prejudice to
the rights of the heirs of the beneficiary to assert in the adminis-
5Tx. REv. Cry. STAT. (Vernon, 1948) art. 4619, § 1. After defining community
property the section provides, ". . all the effects which the husband and wife possess
at the time the marriage may be dissolved shall be regarded as common effects or gains
unless the contrary be satisfactorily proved."
a 24 Tax. Jun., Insurance, § 73.
7 66 S. W. 128 (Tex. Civ. App. 1901) er. ref.
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tration of the insured's estate, any interest in the proceeds as the
community effects of the deceased couple.
The supreme court's decision in the present case is to be lauded
insofar as it disposes of the community property question and
eliminates the possible necessity of an additional lawsuit. This
observation rests on the assumption that it is necessary to consider
the disposition of the proceeds of this policy in the light of appli-
cable provisions of Texas' community property laws. Logically, it
would seem that if such laws are applicable to the fact situation
here, they should also apply to a situation where a brief period
of survivorship is proven by the administrators of the estate of
the beneficiary. However, in such an instance the right to the
proceeds would have vested in the wife during such interval, and
since the marriage would have been dissolved by the husband's
death, such right would not have accrued during coverture and
could not be said to have been a part of the community effects.
Such reasoning would constitute a legal basis for awarding the
whole of the proceeds to the wife's estate, if she had been shown
to survive. It is difficult, then, to understand how the issue could
be settled on the basis of community property laws, since the
administrator of the wife's estate failed to establish the proof
required by the policy and the existing law to enable him to re-
cover. In Martin v. McAllister' the court said:
The right to the proceeds of the policy, whether upon the life of the
wife in favor of the husband or upon the life of the husband in favor
of the wife, rests upon the same principle, which is that the proceeds
of the policy belong to the person named as payee, and it becomes
property upon the contingency of the death of the insured in the life-
time of the payee. Therefore, as it could not become the property of
the husband or the wife during the lifetime of both of them, it can not
be held to be community property, and is therefore the separate prop-
erty of the one to whom it is made payable.
In the absence of proof of survivorship by the wife, the certificate
in the present case was clearly made payable to the administrator
8 94 Tex. 567, 570, 63 S. W. 624, 625 (1901).
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of the insured's estate. The McAllister case held that by virtue
of the husband's right to control the community funds, he was
legally justified in taking out a policy of insurance on his wife's
life, payable to himself at her death, where such act was not
fraudulent towards the wife. There was clearly no fraud in the
present case in connection with the payee clause, and a decision
resting on the legal import of the payee clause would appear to
rest on a more logical foundation.
Had the deaths occurred after the effective date of the Simulta-
neous Death Act,9 the husband's estate would have received the
proceeds of the policy.
STRICT CONSTRUCTION AGAINST INSURER PLACED ON
EXCEPTIONS AND WORDS OF LIMITATION
Texas. A host of decisions have established as a settled prin-
cipal of insurance law that language of a policy which is sus-
ceptible to more than one construction should be interpreted
strictly against the insurer and liberally in favor of the insured.
The Texas courts are in accord with this principle." The difficulty
in the application of this rule arises when there is a borderline
question as to whether the language is subject to dual construc-
tion. All of the provisions in a policy of insurance may, at first
blush, appear to be clear in their context and legal import, whereas
a closer scrutiny may reveal an inconsistency between certain
clauses which give rise to an open issue when rights are being
asserted under the contract. Ambiguity sometimes results from
the use of one word in a clause. In such cases a serious legal con-
troversy usually ultimately centers around the connotation to be
given the word involved. The courts will apply the rule of strict
construction against the insurer if they find the meaning not to be
clear insofar as its import favoring the insurer is concerned.
TEx. Rav. Civ. STAT. (Vernon, 1952 Supp.) art. 2583, § 5, reads: "When the
insured and the beneficiary in a policy of life or accident insurance have died and
there is no direct evidence that they have died otherwise than simultaneously, the pro-
ceeds of the policy shall be distributed as if the insured had survived the beneficiary."
10 24 TEx. JuR., Insurance, § 29, p. 705.
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The Supreme Court of Texas was presented with an issue of
this nature in Continental Casualty Co. v. Warren." In the case an
employer had assigned the rights arising under an airplane acci-
dent insurance policy to the widow of an employee who was pilot
of the airplane on the occasion when it crashed and who lost his
life in the mishap. The policy in question contained, among others,
two paragraphs which gave rise to the lawsuit. The court desig-
nated these clauses as the "insured persons" paragraph and the
"injury" paragraph. The "insured persons" paragraph provided
for indemnity to the employer for loss resulting from injury
sustained by any officer, employee or guest of the employer.
The "injury" paragraph provided that the injury must have been
sustained by the insured person as a consequence of riding as a
passenger in the airplane, boarding or alighting therefrom, or
being struck by the airplane. The issue for consideration by the
court was whether the trial court had properly sustained a special
exception to the assignee's pleadings on the ground that the word
"passenger" in the "injury" paragraph operated to exclude the
pilot, since he was killed while piloting the aircraft, as distin-
guished from being merely transported therein.
The supreme court held that the "insured persons" paragraph
clearly made the pilot an insured person by the use of the word
"employee" therein. It also held that the "injury" paragraph did
not clearly operate to exclude the pilot from coverage by the use
of the word "passenger." It was pointed out that common usage
often places the operator of a vehicle in the category of a passen-
ger, especially when the vehicle is private and not being used in
connection with transporting for hire. The court reasoned that
there would have been no doubt as to coverage under the "injury"
paragraph had the pilot been injured in the act of boarding, alight-
ing from, or being subjected to any of the other risks enumerated
except riding, as was the actual situation. On the basis of the ap-
parent inconsistency in these two clauses, and in the absence of
11 - Tex. -. , 254 S. W. 2d 762 (1953).
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any other clause which categorically denied coverage to the pilot,
the majority of the court held that the ambiguity as to intent should
be resolved in favor of the insured. Thus, the decision of the
court of civil appeals reversing the trial court was affirmed.
As an illustration of the difficulties encountered by the courts
in deciding this type of issue, it appears pertinent to point out
that four justices joined in registering a strong dissenting view.
They found a clear intent to exclude the pilot from coverage. They
found that the word "passenger" clearly operated as an exclusion.
The majority opinion appears to the writer to be better sup-
ported by the authorities. Considering the fact that the aircraft was
a private airplane as distinguished from a public passenger type,
and keeping in mind the owner's logical purpose in obtaining the
insurance, it is difficult to suppose that the owner was made aware
of the fact that the pilot was to be excluded. The insurer could
easily have excluded the pilot by a clear, positive limitation
clause, had such been its manifest intent, and all parties to the
contract of insurance would have had a more definite idea as to
their rights thereunder. That such an intent should be manifested
is forcefully expounded by the court in American Indemnity Co.
v. Mexia Independent School District:2
Insurance companies cannot couch their contracts in doubtful lan-
guage and allow their salesmen to employ the construction most favor-
able to the insured to catch the unwary and then, when the company
is hailed into court, claim the benefit of the construction most favor-
able to it.
It appears most likely that the owner of the airplane would
have been led to believe that any employee, including the pilot,
who was injured in a manner consistent with the provisions of the
"injury" paragraph would have been covered by the policy. In
any event, the exact meaning of the clauses is so uncertain as to
bring the case under the rule as applied by the majority of the
court.
1247 S. W. 2d 682, 685 (Tex. Civ. App. 1952).
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Another case in which the outcome centered around the judi-
cial interpretation of one word was decided by the supreme court
in 1953. The word involved was "war," and the issue turned on
the treatment of the Korean conflict as such in connection with a
war clause in an accidental death benefit policy. Double indem-
nity was denied the widow of a reserve army officer killed in the
crash of a military aircraft in which he was being transported
under orders in Western Reserve Life Ins. Co. v. Meadows. 8 The
policies under which recovery was sought were restricted as to
the double indemnity feature by the existence of a clause which
provided that such accidental death benefits would be void if the
insured were in the military, naval or allied service in time of
war at the date of the accident. The widow contended that the war
clause should not operate to exclude the insurer from double
indemnity because of the fact that the Korean conflict had arisen
without an official declaration of war and had continued to be
conducted on such basis.
The court held that the terms used in a contract of insurance
are to be given their plain, ordinary and generally accepted mean-
ing unless the instrument itself shows them to have been used in
a different or technical sense. It stated that the word "war" when
used in connection with such a clause as that under consideration
should be interpreted in the practical and realistic sense in which
it is commonly used and understood rather than in a formal or
technical sense. Finding that the plain, ordinary and generally
accepted meaning of the word "war" is war in fact, the court re-
versed the judgment of the court of civil appeals which had
allowed recovery to the widow.
The court indulged in a lengthy, excellent discussion of ele-
ments which, from the viewpoint of constitutional law, would tend
to establish the Korean conflict as a war de jure independently of
a declaration by Congress. It chose to deal squarely with the issue,
13 ------ Tex ...-. 261 S. W. 2d 554 (1953).
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however, and to decide whether the very question presented would
not dispose of the case. That question was whether the word "war"
as used in the policy meant war in fact or war declared by Congress.
It will be noted that in the two cases discussed, the court con-
sidered the words "passenger" and "war" in their common, ordi-
nary and generally accepted meanings and decided for the insurer
in one case and against the insurer in the other. In the one case
the word "passenger," when so considered under all the circum-
stances, left the intention of the parties shadowed with doubt and
rendered the meaning of the policy ambiguous. In the other case
the use of the word "war" when considered in its literal sense,
indicated a clear limitation of coverage, and should have been
contemplated by the parties as a limitation of coverage under the
facts of the present case. It is submitted that the related issues
posed by these two cases have been consistently resolved on the
basis of a sound principle.
Feazin W. Windham.
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